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	 198 players, including six quarterbacks, were selected before Tom Brady in the 2000 NFL draft. 
Those quarterbacks included Southwest Texas State’s Spergon Wynn, who posted an abysmal 39.5 
rating in 10 games for the Cleveland Browns and the Minnesota Vikings, and Hofstra’s Giovanni 
Carmazzi, who never so much as played a regular-season down for the San Francisco 49ers. Brady, you 
may know, proved to be one of  the greatest quarterbacks in the game’s history, posting eye-popping 
individual stats while leading the New England Patriots to six Super Bowls and four championships.  2
Now consider the question: “Should the 49ers, say, have drafted Brady instead of  Carmazzi?” 
	 Some will say, “Yes, of  course.” Others will answer, “No. Given what anyone could have known 
at the time, drafting Carmazzi was the smart choice.” Still others will say, “Look, there’s obviously some 
sense in which they should have drafted Brady, and some sense in which they were right to draft 
Carmazzi.” 
	 To introduce some terminology: The first answer seems to presume that reasons for action are 
“objective” — that they depend on how the world actually is or will be, rather than on things like 
beliefs, evidence, and probabilities regarding how the world is or will be. The second answer seems to 
rest on the idea that reasons for action are “subjective” — that they depend on beliefs, evidence, or 
probabilities, rather than on the way things generally are or will be. The third answer expresses the view 
that there are both objective reasons and subjective reasons. !
	 The philosophical literature on “subjective and objective reasons” is booming, but it is marked 
by a schism. Philosophers on one side focus on questions like, “Are reasons (or requirements, or 
“oughts”) objective or are they subjective?”; philosophers on the other side focus on questions like, 
“How are objective reasons (or requirements, or “oughts”) related to subjective reasons (or 
requirements, or “oughts”)?” I’m going to call contributors to the first project “Debaters”, since they 
take there to be a worthwhile debate between so-called “objectivists” and so-called “subjectivists” about 
reasons, and contributors to the second project “Dividers”, since they propose to divide talk of  reasons 
into talk of  subjective reasons and talk of  objective reasons.  Dividers tend to think that the Debaters’ 3
central question occasions a "merely verbal", or "shallow", or "nonsubstantive", or "pointless" dispute. 
Debaters tend to think that Dividers are avoiding an important, substantive debate and instead 
trafficking in concepts of  derivative importance or dubious connection to reality. 
	 But things are slightly more complicated than just “Debaters vs. Dividers”. For one thing, there 
are different reasons why any given Debater or Divider might focus on the question she does. The 
grounds may be conceptual; a Debater might assume that there’s a univocal sense of  “ought” or “a 
reason”, while a Divider might deny this. Or the grounds may be metaphysical; a Divider might assume 
that there are both subjective and objective reasons, while a Debater might allege that reasons of  at 
least one of  these types do not exist. Or the grounds may be specifically practical; a Debater might 
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acknowledge the existence of  both subjective and objective reasons, but think it is in some sense more 
important to answer questions about reasons simpliciter, while a Divider might take the view that even if, 
say, subjective reasons do not exist, they are in some sense a convenient fiction, and as such, worth 
theorizing about. 
	 Secondly, it is possible be more or less extreme of  a Divider about any given normative notion. 
A less extreme Divider will urge a distinction between objective and subjective reasons, but see it as a 
serious question whether the latter depend, e.g., on an agent's beliefs or instead on her evidence. A more 
extreme Divider may say that we ought to jettison talk of  subjective reasons tout court in favor of  talk of  
belief-relative reasons, credence-relative reasons, evidence-relative reasons, rational-belief-relative 
reasons, and so on. 
	 Third, one may be a Divider about some normative notions and a Debater about others. As we 
will see, one reasonable stance distinguishes between objective reasons and subjective reasons, but sees 
merit in straightfoward debates about what we are obligated to do. !
	 Very little has been written on the comparative merits of  the Debater and Divider projects. At 
first glance, this is surprising. Here we have the same kind of  issue being approached through two 
different frameworks, with the adherents of  each framework aware of  the other, and with each 
framework such that if  it is a sound way to approach the issue, the other framework is apparently not. 
Why, then, has this cold war not heated up? Well, a Debater or Divider submitting an article to a 
journal is not going to get very far by sticking her main argument behind a lengthy defense of  the 
legitimacy of  her project. For better or worse, the "let a thousand flowers bloom" culture of  
contemporary philosophy enables cold wars to drag on. Nor are meta-ethicists apt to take up arms for 
one side against the other. Meta-ethics tends to focus on normative concepts and properties generally 
rather than on specifically subjective or objective normative concepts and properties. So I thought the 
best use of  an article like this would be to discuss what's largely missing from the literature but on the 
minds of  many of  its contributors: Which of  these divergent streams of  inquiry is tackling the issues 
correctly? 
	 Of  the many considerations that may be marshalled for either side, I want to focus on two. First, 
appeals are made on both sides to the action-guiding role we want concepts like that of  a reason to play. 
Dividers will typically say that in guiding our actions by norms, we appeal to both subjective and 
objective reasons; Debaters will typically say that we can guide our actions by norms if  and only if  there 
is one primary or “practical” notion of  a reason. We will spend some time, then, on the question of  
which notion(s) of  a reason we must employ to guide our actions. Second, the notion of  a 
"nonsubstantive" dispute looms large in the Debater vs. Divider standoff. If  questions about reasons 
simpliciter are non-substantive, then Dividerism seems to be the way to go. But if  such questions are 
substantive, then it would seem that Debaters are asking the really important question. With 
metaphilosophy all the rage these days, there are no shortage of  approaches to thequestion of  when 
some philosophical question is non-substantive. I will see how some of  these bear on the clash between 
Debaters and Dividers. !
Action Guidance 
	 Facts about the action-guiding roles of  normative concepts may seem to lend greater support to 
the Dividers than to the Debaters. For it seems that we employ both objective and subjective normative 
notions to guide our actions — the former when we are certain, and the latter when we are uncertain, 
about the relevant facts. Suppose you are sure that stopping for coffee will make you late for a meeting, 
and wonder what you should do. The notion of  "should" at play here seems to be the objective one. 
You are implicitly asking yourself, "What should I do given that the world is such that stopping for coffee 
and being on time are mutually exclusive?" (Some may describe you as implicitly asking, "What should 
I do given that I believe that stopping for coffee and being on time are mutually exclusive?" But this is as 
implausible as the idea that we append "I believe" to every premise in our theoretical reasoning. And even 
if  we occasionally ask ourselves what to do given what we believe, the answer has practical force for us 
only because, from our perspective, what we believe is the case is the case. Otherwise, conclusions about 
what to do given your beliefs would be as practically impotent for you as would be conclusions about 
what to do given, say, your neighbor’s beliefs.) 
	 But now suppose that you are unsure whether stopping for coffee will make you late, and you 
wonder what you should do. Here, the notion of  should at play seems to be a more subjective one. You 
are wondering what to do, given that there's some chance that stopping for coffee and being on time are 
mutually exclusive.  It bears mentioning what notion of  “chance” is used here. Some may say it is 4
subjective probability, i.e. degree-of-belief. But this doesn’t seem quite right. If  someone who is certain 
doesn't ask herself  what to do given her beliefs, why would somone who is uncertain ask herself  what to 
do given her degrees of  belief ? Why would uncertainty cause you to assign practical signifance to your 
own mind? It is better to think of  things like this: When I have a full belief  that P, I ask myself, "What 
should I do given that P"? "P" here does not report my full belief  that P; it expresses it. So if  we want to 
know how I reason when I'm uncertain whether P, we need to know what expresses uncertainty — what 
stands to a degree of  belief  that P as "P" stands to the belief  that P. Several recent writers have argued 
that what plays this role is an "epistemic probability" statement, which is to be distinguished from an 
objective probability, or an evidential probability, or of  course a subjective probability statement. These 
writers have further converged an expressivistic meta-semantic treatment for such statements.  When I 5
have a degree of  belief  of  .7 in some relevant P, then, I ask myself: "What should I do given that there's 
a .7 [epistemic] probability that P?” 
	 That we use both objective and subjective “shoulds” in guiding our actions would seem to lend 
at least some support to the Dividers’ view: there are subjective reasons and objective reasons, and the 
really important question in the neighborhood is how to understand the former in terms of  the latter, or 
the latter in terms of  the former. !
	 But several replies are open to the Debater: 
(1) Right off  the bat, he will point out that these considerations support, at most, Divider-ism about some 
normative notions. An agent needn't suppose that reasons, obligations, rightness, and wrongness all 
come in objective and subjective flavors. She can guide all of  her actions, whether under certainty or 
uncertainty,  using only a subjective "ought" and an objective "ought". So we can simply be Dividers 6
about "ought" and Debaters about everything else. !
(2) An "objectivist" Debater may deny that we need to appeal to subjective notions to guide our actions, 
even under uncertainty. All we need, she'll say, are objective notions, plus the practical concept of  an 
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attempt or try. An uncertain agent may ask himself  (albeit stiltedly), "Which action would be my best 
try at doing what I have objective reason to do?” — just as he may ask himself, "Which investment 
strategy would constitute my best attempt at making money?" — and guide himself  by the answer. One 
no more needs the notion of  a subjective reason, or subjective "ought", than one needs the concept of  
“subjective money”. 
	 This reply only works, however, if  the Divider takes the notion of  the subjective “ought” to be 
something other than the notion of  just such a try. But she needn’t, and I think shouldn’t. In other 
work, I argue that we can define what I subjectively ought to do as my best try at doing what I have 
objective reason to do.  Indeed, I argue that this is the only satisfactory definition of  a subjective 7
normative notion in terms of  an objective one. To ask oneself  what is one's best try at doing what one 
has objective reason to do is simply to ask what one subjectively ought to do, only in different words. !
(3) Additionally, the Debater may argue that considerations of  action-guidance support nothing 
stronger than the conceptual claim that there are both subjective and objective normative notions. This 
is consistent with either subjective or objective reasons being mere fictions that we cannot help but 
employ. For consider an analogy: a skeptic about free will may allow, with Kant, that we cannot help 
but act under “the idea of  a free will”, but then deny that this provides any reason to believe in free will. 
From the perspective of  both the Debater and the free will skeptic, the move from “we cannot help but 
accept X” to “X exists” elides the distinction between the natural necessity of  the “cannot” in the 
premise and the normative necessity of  the sort of  “cannot” that would be required to warrant the 
conclusion. 
	 Now, it’s worth keeping in mind that the same kind of  reply is available against the Debater who 
wants to use action-guidance to support her view. It is a general objection to arguments from practical 
ineliminability. So this reply cannot help the Debater except by perhaps cancelling out what would 
otherwise be a point in his opponent’s favor. 
	 But the Divider can say more than that. She can take the view that guidance considerations 
support not only her conceptual claim, but what I’d earlier called her “practical” claim as well — and 
that they do so even if  there are no such thing as subjective rightness. For if  subjective rightness is a 
fiction, then it is at least a useful fiction; when we are uncertain, we can only purposefully bring our 
conduct into line with what objective reasons require by reasoning that invokes the notion of  subjective 
rightness (which, again, we should think of  in terms of  the notion of  an attempt, or try). This would 
seem to vindicate the value of  such reasoning, and by extension, of  the Dividers’ philosophical 
theorizing about how subjective rightness links up with objective reasons. 
	 At this point, though, we might start to wonder why we shouldn’t just admit that subjective 
rightness exists along with the objective rightness. We’ve established that its concept exists, and is useful. 
Many of  our intuitions support its existence — notably, the intuition that one oughtn’t to act recklessly 
as such. The intuitive support grows once we start thinking of  subjective rightness in terms of  trying. 
For are we really going to deny that there’s such a thing as a best try at doing what one has objective 
reason to do, or that what counts as the best try here depends, as the quality of  a try does elsewhere, on 
probabilities? Of  course meta-ethics is full of  arguments that our ordinary moral judgments are not to 
be trusted, but all such arguments that I know of  apply to reasons and rightness generally, not to 
subjective rightness specifically. !
(4) A Debater might also reply not by rejecting subjective or objective normativity, but by urging that an 
additional, specifically "practical" sort of  normativity is the one most crucial to the guidance of  action. 
And since this role is so important, the debate over what we practically ought to do should take 
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precedence over less significant debates about what we subjectively or objectively ought to do. The 
Debater might even say that it’s this practical sense of  “ought” that we’re employing when we ask the 
straightforward question of  what we ought simpiciter to do. 
	 Now, there is a sense in which even Divider can accept facts about what we ought in this sense to 
do. He can simply identify the concept of  the practical "ought" (in a context of  action) with the concept 
of  just whatever "ought" is used in practical reasoning (in that context), and say that the objective ought 
is the practical ought in contexts of  certainty and the subjective ought is the practical ought in contexts 
of  uncertainty. This is obviously not what the Debater has in mind. 
	 So what does he have in mind? Perhaps it that, contra the Divider’s suggestion, we cannot guide 
our actions under either certainty or uncertainty by either objective or subjective notions — that instead, 
she must employ in all contexts a specifically "practical" notion that cannot be identified with either the 
subjective or objective one. What motivates this suggestion is that, unless there is a practical "ought" to 
arbitrate between or supercede the subjective and objective "oughts", the agent she will face "deontic 
dilemmas" in cases where subjective normativity points one way and objective normativity points 
another. 
	 But we need to be careful here. That subjective and objective reasons can favor different actions 
does not mean that they can appear do so from the agent's perspective. Of  course, we are familiar with cases 
in which reasons may be opposed from an agent's point of  view just as they may be opposed in reality. 
Moral reasons may favor being on time for my meeting with the studen while prudential reasons favor 
grabbing a coffee first, and so it may seem from the my perspective as the agent. But I shall want to 
claim that there can never appear, from the perspective of  the agent, to be a truly practical conflict 
between subjective and objective reasons. 
	 For suppose I am sure that I objectively ought to do A. Then the question of  what I subjectively 
ought to do need never arise for me. I can simply guide my behavior by my objective "ought"-thought. 
And if  for whatever reason I do ask myself  what I subjectively ought to do, my answer cannot, on pain 
of  obvious incoherence, be anything other than "A". So no conflict from my perspective here. 
	 And now suppose I am uncertain whether I objectively ought to do A or to do B. Then I can't 
guide myself  by my objective "ought"-thoughts. They don't "point" me towards either action. This 
means that if  I then go on to form a view about what I subjectively ought to do, that view will guide me. 
No conflict from my perspective here, either. 
	 We might say that subjective reasons are "transparent" to objective ones from the subject's 
perspective, just as (and because) a good try is transparent to a well-executed action, and just as my 
believing that P is transparent to P.  So it seems that agents will simply never take themselves to face 8
"deontic dilemmas" between subjective and objective reasons, notwithstanding the fact that these two 
kinds of  reasons may come apart in reality. !
	 But the Debater has a rejoinder. There are some cases in which subjective "ought"-questions 
arise for an agent despite her being certain in some way about certain crucial objective "ought"-
questions. These are so-called "mineshaft" or "Jackson" cases. Here is Frank Jackson's original example: !
Jill is a physician who has to decide on the correct treatment for her patient, John, who 
has a minor but not trivial skin complaint. She has three drugs to choose from: drug A, 
drug B, and drug C. Careful consideration of  the literature has led her to the following 
opinions. Drug A is very likely to relieve the condition but will not completely cure it. 
One of  the drugs B and C will completely cure the skin condition; the other though will 
kill the patient, and there is no way that she can tell which of  the two is the perfect cure 
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and which the killer drug.  9!
	 Obviously, Jill is uncertain about some objective normative claims; that is why the subjective 
"ought"-question arises for her in the first place. Notably, she is uncertain whether she objectively ought 
to prescribe Drug B or ought to prescribe Drug C, and unsure whether the ranking of  the candidate 
actions in terms of  objective value is {Prescribe B, Prescribe A, Prescribe C} or {Prescribe B, Prescribe 
A, Prescribe C}.  
	 She is, however, certain that she objectively oughtn't to prescribe A, and that she objectively 
ought to prescribe B or objectively ought to prescribe C. Furthermore, we may say she is certain that 
she subjectively ought to prescribe A. So doesn't she face what she regards as a deontic conflict, with 
objective reasons pointing away from A and either toward B or toward C, and subjective reasons 
pointing toward A? And won't she face a further question of  what she ought to do in light of  this 
conflict — one that is answerable only in terms of  a specifically practical "ought" that is distinct from 
either the subjective or the objective one?  10
	 Well, that's not what my phenomenology suggests. I imagine myself  in Jill's circumstances asking 
what to do, not getting an answer, asking myself  what to do given that it's unclear what I ought to do, 
getting an answer ("Prescribe A"), and then just doing that action in a way that seems fully guided and 
intelligible and in no way "alien". There is simply no need for any further “arbitration”. If  called upon 
to justify why I stop there and act, I would say something like this: Subjective normative questions are 
about how best to take into account the various ways the world might be vis a vis what is objectively 
significant — in this case, the patient’s health. In saying that I subjectively ought to prescribe A, I’ve 
already taken into account that it’s certainly not the best for the patient’s health, but have judged that, 
from the point of  view of  the patient’s health, that fact is not dispositive. There is no serious question 
whether to “go with” subjective or objective normativity, even in Jackson cases, for to make a judgment 
about what I subjectively ought to do is to have already implicitly stripped any contrary objective 
normative judgments of  anything more than pro tanto force from my perspective. 
	 I like to think about this issue in terms of  the structural analogy John Broome draws between 
choices under uncertainty (where value is spread out over epistemically possible worlds), and questions 
of  distribution (where value is spread out over subjects).  To say that one certainly objectively oughtn’t 11
to do A is to say that there is no way the world might be in which A is what one objectively ought to do, 
which is analogous to saying that there is no person in a population for whom D is the distribution of  
goods that provides the greatest well-being. To say that, nonetheless, one subjectively ought to do A is to 
say that A is the action that best takes into account what is objectively valuable, spread out over all the 
ways the world might be. This is analogous to saying that D is the distribution of  goods that best takes 
into account each person’s interests — in other words, that it is the just distribution. But we do not, in 
making choices about how to allocate resources, regard there as being a serious “dispute” that must first 
be settled when the just distribution is not the “top choice” of  anyone in the population. To call a 
distribution “just” is to have already settled the relevant allocatory question in favor of  that distribution. !
(5) Finally, the Debater might try to show that making too much of  “guidance” considerations puts us 
on a path to error. For just as we may be uncertain about ordinary factual claims, we may be uncertain 
about moral ones. The Divider, as we’ve been representing her so far, will want to say that we can guide 
our actions under moral uncertainty only by norms that are appropriately sensitive to it. And this, in 
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turn, would commit her to the view that some of  these norms are correct, or at least good to accept.  
	 But isn’t this counterintuitive? For suppose Cain’s credences are exhaustively distributed over evil 
moral theories. A norm that is sensitive to these credences would almost surely prescribe an evil action. 
But of  course, it is obviously false to say that anyone ought to do an evil action, and so we should reject 
either the Divider’s psychological claim about guidance under uncertainty or her normative claim 
about its relevance to what one ought to do.  12
	 The most effective response to this objection relies on our earlier point about epistemic 
probabilities. Contra the objector, a person when acting under uncertainty does not employ an "ought" 
that is relative to that uncertainty, any more than she uses a belief-relative “ought” when acting under 
full belief. Instead, she uses an "ought" that is relative to epistemic probabilities — statements of  which 
express rather than report credences — and so thus far the Divider is committed only to epitemic-
probability-relative “oughts”. The Divider may say of  Cain: "Of  course he oughn’t, in the sense 
relevant to action-guidance under uncertainty, to do objectively evil acts; the epistemic probabilities of  
moral theories that sanction such acts is almost nil [the Divider says, expressing her own credences]. I 
know that Cain, expressing his credences, says they're high. But he's just wrong." 
	  
	 The Debater can push further, however. For just as we may be uncertain about ordinary facts 
and moral claims, we may be uncertain about what to do in the face of  uncertainty about moral claims, 
and uncertain about what what to do in the face of  that uncertainty, and so on. Presumably we need 
“oughts” to guide our action under uncertainty at all of  these levels. This opens the Divider up to two 
objections. 
	 The first is the "inconsistency" objection. Suppose that you are uncertain between utilitarianism 
and contractualism. It is natural to say that what is subjectively right is determined by the epistemic 
probabilities of  these two theories, in accordance with the correct theory of  what to do under moral 
uncertainty (call it "T1"). But now suppose you are uncertain between T1 and some competing theory, 
T2. Then it is tempting to say that what is subjectively right is determined by the epistemic probabilities 
of  T1 and T2, in accordance with the correct theory of  what to do under that uncertainty. But the 
subjectively right action as determined in the first way needn't be the same as the subjectively right 
action as determined in the second way. So it would seem that subjective normativity is inconsistent. 
The problem, put sloganistically, is that that there is some tension, revealed in cases of  multi-level 
normative uncertainty, between the idea that subjective normativity can be genuinely subjective and the 
idea that it can be genuinely normative. 
	 The second is the "regress" objection: We can imagine someone who is not only uncertain at 
both the "levels" just mentioned, but indeed, uncertain at all levels. Indeed, one would suspect that this 
blanket uncertainty is typical. For who among us is certain about morality, let alone such esoterica as 8th-
order, or 1000th-order, normative uncertainty? But recall what animated our Divider in the first place: 
that we cannot guide our behavior by norms about which we are uncertain. It would seem to follow 
from this that someone who is uncertain “all the way up” will be unable to guide her behavior by norms 
at all. This is a problem for the Divider. Her ground for positing subjective reasons was that practical 
thought in terms of  such reasons helps with the guidance of  action. But now it’s starting to look like it 
doesn’t help after all.  13
	 I give a response to the "inconsistency" objection in my paper "What to Do When You Don't 
Know What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do…”.  The part of  the paper that matters here 14
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can be summarized as follows: There can be many different orders of  the sorts of  subjective reasons that 
are relevant to action-guidance. First-order ones depend on epistemic probabilities regarding what I 
have objective reason to do. Second-order ones depend on epistemic probabilities regarding the first-
order ones. And so on for third-order ones and second-order ones, etc. There is no more inconsistency 
in saying that I have most third-order subjective reason to do one thing and most second-order 
subjective reason to do another than in saying that I have most subjective reason (of  whatever order) to 
do one thing and most objective reason to do another. 
	 Nor must we say that there is something that there is most subjective reason "overall" to do. We 
can allow that the different levels are incomparable. This is because each order is "transparent" to the 
one below it, just as first-order subjective reasons are, as I argued above, transparent to objective ones: 
If  I am certain about what I Nth order subjectively ought to do, questions of  N+1th order subjective 
normativity will never arise, and so I cannot face what I regard as an inter-level conflict. On the other 
hand, if  I am uncertain what I Nth order subjectively ought to do, then I cannot guide my behavior by 
subjective norms of  this order, and so I will see no conflict here, either. Again, we can make sense of  
this by thinking of  subjective normativity in terms of  trying. Just as what I (first-order) subjectively 
ought to do is my best try at doing what I have objective reason to do, what I second-order subjectively 
ought to do is my best try at doing what I have first-order objective reason to do. But one never faces 
what one regards as the choice between doing A well and giving one's best try at doing A. 
	 The "regress" objection is trickier. It helps a bit to recall that it is only under occurrent 
uncertainty that we need to resort to subjective norms. This means that one way for the regress to stop 
is for the agent to cease to be occurrently uncertain of  the relevant norms despite being dispositionally 
uncertain of  them. And of  course there are many, many things of  which we are dispositionally 
uncertain but not occurrently uncertain. Some speculative social science: plenty of  people wonder 
about what to do under uncertainty; as far as I know, nobody is sitting in stasis, hoping in vain (or 
rather, having vain hopes crop up in her mind!) for certainty about what she 242nd-order subjectively 
ought to do. 
	 However, this is not a completely satisfactory answer. For if  this is our story about how the 
regress stops and guided action becomes possible, it is unclear why there is any value to engaging in 
guided action as opposed to simply taking an unguided "leap of  faith” in the face of  occurrent 
uncertainty. The difference between a norm-guided action and a leap of  faith becomes merely 
psychological: dispositional uncertainty gives rise to conscious uncertainty in one case, and yet I act (a 
leap of  faith); dispositional uncertainty fails to give rise to conscious uncertainty in the other case, and so 
I act (the regress stops). But normatively speaking, it is difficult to distinguish between leaps of  faith and 
guided actions; in both cases, the agent is behaving in a way that is not completely responsive to her 
underlying, dispositional uncertainty. That her action feels more intelligible in one case than in the other 
is irrelevant. 
	 If  the leap/guidance distinction is not, as such, of  any normative significance, then why should 
the fact that we employ subjective "oughts" to guide some of  our actions make us think that there are 
subjective “ought”-facts, or that it is good to theorize and deliberate as though there were? We don't 
generally think that the essentiality of  a concept to a worthless practice speaks in favor of  that concept. 
	 In a short piece for The Philosophers’ Magazine,  I gesture at a response: The advantage of  15
subjective “oughts” is that they enable us to forestall action under dispositional uncertainty, even if  they 
cannot eliminate it. It is better, in a certain sense and ceteris paribus, to employ an “ought” that is relative 
to epistemic probabilities of  views about about what to do in the face of  moral uncertainty than to 
employ one that is relative to epistemic probabilities of  moral views themselves, better still to employ an 
“ought” that is relative to epistemic probabilities of  views about what to do in the face of  uncertainty 
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about what to do in the face of  moral uncertainty, and so on. But I should emphasize that this response 
is still at an early stage of  development. I am unaware of  any other replies to the “regress” objection. !
Nonsubstantive Disputes 
	 There is a tendency among Dividers to see Debaters as engaging in disputes that are silly, not in 
good order, nonsubstantive. If  they are right, then of  course this is to the Debaters' discredit. But if  they 
are wrong, then this is obviously to their own discredit, for then they would be turning away from the 
good question of  what we have reason simpliciter to do in favor of  questions of  subsidiary importance. 
	 What might the charge of  “nonsubstantiveness" amount to? Perhaps the idea is that 
"objectivism vs. subjectivism" disputes are really instances of  people talking past each other — of  the 
subjectivist employing one “ought” (i.e. the subjective one) and the objectivist employing another 
“ought” (i.e. the objective one).   16
	 The Debaters' first line of  defense should be to appeal to the behavior of  competent speakers. 
Presumably the philosophers engaged in these disputes are competent speakers of  (let us say) the 
English language. What's more, they are reflective about the concepts they use — in the habit of  
rooting out differences without distinctions and distinctions without differences. Finally, they are aware 
that other philosophers (i.e. some Dividers) say that they are merely talking past each other, which 
should be enough to render this possibility salient. And yet, it does not seem to them that they are 
merely talking past one another. This is some evidence that they indeed are not. 
	 The Dividers may respond that talking past someone can sometimes feel like disagreeing with 
her, even for the reflective speaker. There are at least two ways for such a confusion to arise. Perhaps the 
two sides are using different "ought" or "obligation" concepts, but their insistent use of  those concepts is 
attributable to an unexpressed difference of  opinion about which of  the concepts is more important, 
about which one we should care about. Or perhaps their verbal behavior is attributable to an 
unexpressed semantic dispute — about which of  their two notions the word  "obligation" stands for. In 
either case, since their exchange has the surface appearance of  a disagreement, and indeed is attributable 
to a difference of  opinion of  some sort or other, it is not hard to see how they might think they are 
really disagreeing when in fact they are not. 
	 This reply would be stronger, perhaps, if  we could use these very debunking explanations to 
convince disputants like these that they really are talking past one another. But it is not clear that we 
could. Again, we are dealing with very reflective philosophers here, who presumably all know about 
these alternative interpretations of  what's going on in their in-house discussions. !
	 But there are subtler versions of  the charge that "objectivist vs. subjectivist" debates are 
nonsubstantive. 
	 In the “metametaphyics literature”, Karen Bennett presses an "epistemicist" version of  the 
nonsubstantivity charge against certain metaphysical disputes. In these, so-called "difference-
minimizing" disputes, each side so effectively captures what the other side initially takes to be evidence 
that we are left with no grounds upon which to adjudicate the matter one way or the other. So even if  
there is a right answer to, say, the "Special Composition Question", we have no way of  knowing what it 
is. An similarly epistemicist position about "subjective vs. objective" debates would hold that 
participants are genuinely disagreeing about what one ought, simpliciter, to do, but that there is no way 
for any of  them to gain and hold dialectical ground. It would seem to be incumbent upon an 
epistemicist to explain why the kinds of  arguments given in "subjectivist vs. objectivist" disputes — e.g. 
"Objectivism is true, for otherwise our obligations would change as subjects' beliefs change or as new 
 See Ross (1939). On “merely verbal” disputes generally, see Chalmers (2011) and Jenkins (2014).16
evidence comes in" ; "Objectivism is false, for it implies in 'Jackson' cases that a morally conscientious 17
person will knowingly do wrong"  — are epistemically feeble in a way that the arguments given in, say, 18
the "utilitarianism vs. deontology" debate are not. For anyone, even the most ardent moral skeptic, 
should admit that the latter debate is at least substantive. 
	 Now, as Bennett acknowledges, the arguments in her paper equally well support the anti-realist 
view that the reason why cannot find answers to certain metaphysical questions is that those questions 
don’t have right answers.  So let us turn to this second view as it applies to "subjectivist vs. objectivist" 19
disputes. The most extreme version holds there are no determinately correct answers to such disputes 
because there are no determinately correct answers to any normative questions. But that’s going a bit 
far. A less extreme theory about rightness simpliciter might say: In cases where beliefs, evidence, and 
reality all line up, there can be determine truths of  what it is right simpliciter to do. It would, for instance, 
be right for Dr. Jill to prescribe a drug she knows would cure the patient. But in cases where beliefs, 
evidence, and reality don't line up, there are no determinate truths about what it's right simpliciter to do. 
These are cases to which there is no uniquely correct projection of  the concept ‘right’ — cases where, 
we might say, "'right' goes on holiday”.  20!
	 Let us consider one last way of  spinning the charge of  nonsubstantivity. One sometimes hears 
the claim that we "could say" of  someone who unknowingly harms another that he did wrong, but that 
we also "could say" that he did not do wrong. Now, one reason we could say either is that neither is 
favored by the evidence; another reason we could say either is that there is no fact of  the matter which 
is true. We have already covered these reasons. But perhaps we should read this locution instead as 
expressing the idea that we could use our words to stand for different concepts than they presently stand 
for. So even if  there is a knowably correct answer to the straightfoward question of  whether the 
aforementioned character did wrong, we "could say" either "He did wrong" or "He did not do wrong" 
just in the sense that we could jettison the concept of  wrong altogether and instead use "wrong" to 
stand for either objective wrongness or subjective wrongness. 
	 Of  course there is some sense in which I am permitted to use or not use any concept. But we 
wouldn't want to say that all debates are nonsubstantive. We avoid this result by saying that there are 
some concepts that I must use on pain of  being worse off  in some respect, but others that I can give up 
costlessly. Concepts in the first category may include those of  force, charge, pain, and action. Concepts 
in the second category presumably include those of  grue, bleen, drug, post-punk, and — to use one of  
Karen Bennett's examples — martini. Suppose there is a knowable fact of  the matter whether a so-
called "vodka martini" is a martini. We may still think a debate about this is shallow, since we could, 
without any apparent cost, simply switch to using "martini" to express a broader concept, martini*, 
under which determinately falls the vodka variant. 
	 But what sort of  "cost" is this? "Worse off" how? There are, broadly speaking, two answers. One 
is the metaphysical realist, or "structuralist" answer, recently defended by Ted Sider:  Some concepts 21
carve nature at the joints, limn its fundamental structure; others do not. We can fail to get the world 
entirely right not only by misapplying concepts, but by failing to use these privileged ones. By contrast, 
 See Ross (1939) and Graham (2010).17
 See Zimmerman (2009).18
 For a defense of this view, see Thomasson (2009).19
 See Wittgenstein (1953). For examples from the history of mathematics, plus the idea that there may be substantive 20
debates about how to "expand" concepts past their (present) senses, see Buzaglo (2002).
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other concepts fail to carve nature at the joints. We capture the world less successfully when we 
misapply these, but not when we fail to use them in the first place. To be sure, it is not obvious whether 
structuralism is true, let alone whether any normative concept corresponds to nature's structure. But let 
us suppose for exploration's sake that the concept of, say, moral rightness does not correspond to it. 
Then the Divider might put her nonsubstantivity charge as follows: "Look, let's suppose the 'objectivist' 
about rightness is correct. What's to stop those with subjectivist inclinations from saying: 'Keep the 
concept of  right for all I care. I'll simply use 'right' to express another concept, right*, which applies to 
actions in virtue of  credences or beliefs or epistemic probabilities.'? Well, if  right doesn't carve at the 
joints, the answer is 'nothing — or, nothing about about the nature of  reality, at least'. But then the 
debate starts to look a bit silly. We could hardly imagine a party to a biological debate saying 'Keep the 
concept Golgi apparatus for all I care...'" 
	 The other answer to "worse how?" is the "pragmatist" answer: It would be worse in the 
straightfoward sense of  making it more difficult for us to pursue the good and avoid the bad were we to 
jettison certain classes of  concepts. Which concepts are privileged in this sense? Concepts that are 
constitutively linked to experience, perhaps. Or maybe concepts that figure in scientific laws. By 
contrast, our replacement of  martini with martini* would have virtually no impact. 
	 At this point, some Debaters will be ready to pounce. They'll say that if  any concepts are 
practically crucial, practical concepts like ought and right and obligation are. Suppose we replaced right, 
which, let's say, has thrill-killing in its anti-extension, with right* — a concept with the same action-
guiding role but that has thrill-killing in its extension. No person who values human life could look upon 
such a replacement with equanimity. There is no hope, then, of  classing "subjectivist vs. objectivist" 
debates as nonsubstantive on the grounds that the concepts involved are, from this pragmatist 
perspective, optional. 
	 But the Divider has a rejoinder. She can say: "Look, this isn't like these other debates. It matters 
whether I do what's right or what's right*; I’ll probably thrill-kill one way and won't the other. But it 
wouldn't matter whether I used "rightness simpliciter" to express a concept that I took to have objectively 
right actions in its extension, or one that I took to have subjectively right ones in its extension. Either 
way, I'll guide my actions under certainty by objective norms and those under uncertainty by subjective 
norms, and that's that. Given what we said in the previous section, it's practically irrelevant what 
concept I use this "rightness simpliciter" to express: any such concept will be a idle wheel, practically 
speaking. 
	 The Debater may now reply that this focus on action-guidance is too narrow. The application of  
normative concepts can bear on what to do in other, less direct ways. If  I think my past action was 
wrong, I may apologize or offer recompense; if  I think it wasn't, I won't. If  I think you are in the wrong 
in using force against Edna, I will try to stop you; if  I think you are in the right, I won't. If  I think that 
Edna acted well throughout her life, I will hold my tongue when asked about her amateurish poetry; if  I 
don't, I won't. In all of  these cases, we can imagine objectivists about rightness simpliciter acting 
differently than subjectivists about rightness simpliciter. For while my present beliefs and my present 
evidence cannot, from my present self's perspective, come apart from the way the world is, the beliefs 
and evidence of  other selves may. Of  course, Dividers may make their characteristic move: "Edna acted 
well in one sense, but not so well in another", and so on. But here the Debater may reply that it is 
rightness simpliciter that grounds the propriety of  apology, third-party intervention, and tongue-holding. 
(She may say so because she simply defines the tout court normative notions as those that play such 
grounding roles; she may also say so as a more substantive thesis).  22
	 This emphasis on normative concepts' indirectly roles is bound to prompt an eliminativist reply 
from at least some Dividers: "We saw that we can guide our actions by employing only the objective and 
subjective senses of  "ought". So why not just talk about who we ought, in these action-guiding senses, to 
compensate, use force against, and so on? Can't we see these tout court notions as merely optional way-
stations on the inferential route from non-normative thoughts to action-guiding conclusions?” This 
recalls what some are inclined to say about the “free will” debate: "Let's just have 'compatibilist free will' 
and 'incompatibilist free will’, and then call the whole thing off." Parties to this debate will reply: "Yes, 
that would be fine if  free will were not so intimately connected with important things like punishment, 
blame, and so forth. But it is.” But this will prompt the retort: "No doubt these are important practical 
questions. But then why talk about free will at all? Why not just cut to the chase and talk about who we 
should punish and who we should blame, and cast the rest of  this to the flames?” 
	 It should be clear that we are now squarely in the realm of  substantive normative ethics, focused 
as we are on what the propriety of  various practices and attitudes depends on. These questions will 
have to be addressed elsewhere. 
	  !!
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